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Kant's Indemonstrable Postulate of
Right: A Response to Paul Guyer
KATRIN FLIKSCHUH
i London School of Economics
'Die Freiheit selbst [ist] nicht in meiner Gewalt'1
I. Introduction
The indispensability of the 'postulate of practical reason with
regard to Right'2 to Kant's property argument in the Rechtslehre is
now widely recognized. However, most commentators continue to
focus their attention on the relation between the postulate and the
deduction of the concept of intelligible possession. The nature of
this relation remains a matter of dispute in part because the precise
position of the postulate within chapter one of the Rechtslehre
remains undecided.3 Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that the
related question has been neglected, as to why Kant should charac-
terize the postulate of Right as a postulate of practical reason. Yet
the fact that he does so is of some significance - especially if one
recalls the definition in the Critique of Practical Reason of postu-
lates of practical reason as practically necessary but theoretically
indemonstrable propositions. What is of interest about this defin-
ition is not just the fact that it designates postulates as practically
necessary and as theoretically indemonstrable at the same time -
even more intriguing is the intimated relation between practical
necessity and theoretical indemonstrability. Kant does not think
the postulates' theoretical indemonstrability morally insignificant.
To the contrary, their moral significance for us appears to be a
function, in part, of their theoretical indemonstrability.
If current interpreters of Kant's practical philosophy have tended
to side-step the issue of the postulates' place within it, this is
largely because of their propositions' transcendent implications -
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implications which are considered to be inappropriate for a
modern, secular, practically orientated philosophical ethics.4
However, some recent approaches have re-opened this issue, and
have argued the systematic importance of the postulates of the
existence of God and of the immortality of the soul to Kant's moral
philosophy once the latter is considered in a manner that goes
beyond practical concerns narrowly conceived.5 Though these
approaches emphasize the importance of appreciating the transcen-
dent dimension within Kant's practical writings, they do not
thereby invoke or endorse a supersensible notion of transcendence
- they do not appeal to a non-natural world peopled by supreme
Beings, or to a Platonic plateau filled with Ideas. To the contrary,
these readings respect the fact that Kant's insistence upon the
theoretical indemonstrability of the postulate of the existence of
God, say, constitutes precisely a rejection of a notion of transcen-
dence that equates it with the existence, or knowability, of a
supersensible world. Transcendence in the Kantian sense must be
understood as the acknowledgement of the moral necessity, for us,
of certain theoretical ideas and propositions, knowledge of the
objective contents of which is in principle unavailable to us. The
transcendent dimension within Kant's practical thinking thus refers
to our acknowledged unknowability of practically necessary theo-
retical propositions and Ideas.6
The present paper examines the status of the postulate of Right
as a postulate of practical reason with reference to this notion of
transcendence as acknowledged unknowability. I shall argue that
the practical significance, for us, of the juridical postulate lies in
our acknowledgement of the theoretical indemonstrability of its
propositional content. The moral significance of such acknow-
ledged unknowability lies in the insight it affords us into our very
limited understanding of the ultimate grounds of our juridical obli-
gations. This line of argument is motivated, in the first instance, by
a recent article by Paul Guyer, which does, unusually, consider the
status of the postulate of Right as a postulate of practical reason.7
Guyer's general approach to Kant's political philosophy is marked
by a concern to demonstrate its philosophical proximity to current
political thinking, especially to Rawlsian liberalism. Guyer accord-
ingly emphasizes what he takes to be the non-metaphysical
character of Kant's political thinking; his substantive focus is on
establishing Kant as the philosophical forerunner of contemporary
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liberalism, thereby demonstrating the supposed topicality of Kant's
political philosophy for a variety of going liberal concerns.8 By
contrast, 'Kant's deductions of the principles of right' forefronts a
number of systematic issues. One of them is the status of the postu-
late of Right as a postulate of practical reason. Guyer comes upon
this issue almost accidentally and as a result of his disagreement
with Markus Willaschek over the moral status of the universal
principle of Right. According to Willaschek, Kant's characteriza-
tion of the universal principle of Right as a 'postulate that is
incapable of further proof'9 shows that it cannot have been derived
from the categorical imperative, for if it had been thus derived,
Kant would not claim it to be non-provable. Since he does claim
this, the universal principle of Right must be treated as a juridical
principle that is conceived independently of the categorical impera-
tive, constituting an 'original expression of rational autonomy'.10
Guyer's immediate concern is to show that the universal principle
of Right is derived from the categorical imperative and that it
does constitute a morally grounded juridical principle. This
concern engages him in an elaborate defence of the provability of the
postulates of practical reason in the second Critique. Guyer's central
claim against Willaschek is that Kant's postulates of practical reason
are not incapable of proof - that they constitute, rather, a 'particular
kind of proof'.11 In a further step, Guyer applies the notion of
practical provability gleaned from his analysis of the second
Critique postulates to the postulate of Right: the idea is to show that
this postulate, too, is capable at least of a practical proof.
I agree with Guyer that the postulate of Right is not posited
arbitrarily or spontaneously, as Willaschek suggests: it is intro-
duced by Kant in the course of a complicated argument designed to
establish our a priori duty to enter into civil society with one
another. Yet I am puzzled as to why Guyer thinks the postulate
provable, or why he believes that it needs to be shown to be prov-
able. Willaschek is right when he says that Kant regards the
postulates of practical reason as incapable of proof - and indeed,
the Rechtslehre repeatedly reminds its readers of the juridical
postulate's non-provability. But Willaschek is wrong to suggest that
the postulates' theoretical indemonstrability compromises their
moral status, and Guyer is therefore also wrong to assume that the
postulates' moral status depends on showing them to be, in some
sense, provable.
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One might suspect the source of my disagreement with Guyer to
be merely terminological. Guyer acknowledges that Kant deems the
postulates of practical reason theoretically indemonstrable: Guyer
only speaks of a special kind of proof - a practical proof - in relation
to the postulates. While Kant considers the postulates of practical
reason to be theoretically indemonstrable, he regards our appeal to
them as justified on practical grounds. So by practical provability
Guyer might mean nothing more than practical justifiability. To
offer a justification of our practically necessary assent to a postu-
late's theoretical proposition is not to offer a theoretical proof of the
truth of its propositional content. Perhaps, therefore, a practical
proof is meant to amount to no more than a practical justification
thus understood. A careful examination of Guyer's argument shows,
however, that although he believes a practical proof of a postulate to
fall short of a theoretical proof, he also thinks that practical prov-
ability takes him further than practical justifiability. Guyer does
seem to want to offer a practical proof of the postulates' theoretical
propositions, not merely a justification of our practically necessary
assent to these propositions. The source of the disagreement
between Guyer and myself is thus not merely terminological. While
Guyer's notion of practical provability is weaker than that of theo-
retical provability, it is stronger than that of practical justifiability.
I believe Guyer's quest for practical provability in relation to
Kant's practical postulates to be misguided. I also believe this quest
to be connected with Guyer's more general concern to provide a
non-metaphysical, non-transcendent reading of Kant's political
philosophy. Yet when applied to the postulate of Right, Guyer's
notion of practical provability encourages a misunderstanding of
its systematic function in the context of Kant's property argument.
It also encourages the wrong moral conclusions. For these reasons
the dispute between Guyer and myself can be characterized as a
dispute over the moral significance of the juridical postulate's
theoretical indemonstrability. Guyer wants to show that in so far as
the postulate of Right is capable of a practical proof, its theoretical
indemonstrability is morally insignificant. Against this, I shall
argue that an acknowledgement of the postulate's theoretical
indemonstrability is morally significant for us in so far as it is
precisely this acknowledgement which affords us insight into the
unconditional (and hence unknowable) grounds of our juridical
obligations towards one another.
4 KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section offers a brief introductory outline of the juridical postu-
late's place and function in part 1 of the Rechtslehre on 'Private
Right'. Section 3 considers the question of the provability of Kant's
postulates of practical reason in general. I distinguish between
theoretical provability and practical provability, and between prac-
tical provability and practical justification. Section 4 argues that
Guyer's analysis of the juridical postulate in terms of practical
provability fails to offer an adequate reconstruction of its system-
atic function within Kant's property argument. I then go on to offer
an alternative interpretation of the postulate's function, which is
based on the notion of practical justifiability. Section 5 contrasts
the normative implications, in relation to the postulate of Right, of
Guyer's notion of practical provability with those of the notion of
practical justifiability. I shall suggest that Guyer's non-metaphysical,
non-transcendent approach is driven by an underlying quest for
moral certainty regarding the grounds of our moral obligations,
including our juridical obligations. But within a Kantian frame-
work, the achievement of such moral certainty comes at a high
price: it leaves us unable to account for the unconditional status of
our moral obligations towards one another. Only a reading that
acknowledges the transcendent dimension within Kant's political
thinking - that acknowledges, in other words, the unknowability
of the grounds of our juridical obligations - can account for the
unconditional status of these obligations.
2. Introducing the Postulate of Practical Reason with
Regard to Right
The principal concern of the Rechtslehre is often assumed to
consist in a vindication of the universal principle of Right as that
principle according to which, 'Any action is right if it can coexist
with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if
on its maxim the power of choice of each can coexist with
everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law'.12
However, I shall follow Bernd Ludwig's interpretation of the
universal principle of Right as derived from the general version of
the categorical imperative outlined in the Groundwork in conjunc-
tion with the concept of Right analysed in the Introduction to the
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007 5
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Rechtslehre.13 On this reading, the universal principle of Right
articulates the categorical imperative as it applies to the domain of
external freedom - freedom of choice and action in general. Since
the Critique of Practical Reason has already vindicated the cate-
gorical imperative as a synthetic a priori principle of practical
reason, a justification of the universal principle of Right cannot, on
this reading, constitute the philosophical burden of the
Rechtslehre. The principal argument is to be found not in the
Introduction but in Part 1 of the text, which deals with 'acquired
Right', that is, with the right to external objects of one's choice.
Kant distinguishes between two categories of Right: innate Right
and acquired Right. Each person has an innate right to freedom,
and has it merely in virtue of their humanity: the innate right to
freedom thus covers a person's inner suum.14 However, Kant denies
that the category of acquired Right, which includes the right to
possession of external objects of one's choice, can be derived from
a person's innate right to freedom directly. This denial represents
Kant's break with theories of natural property rights, a version of
which he had himself endorsed in some of his earlier writings.15
Kant's revised position in the Rechtslehre designates the concept of
a property right as a moral concept, and therefore as a pure
rational concept. As such, the concept of property rights specifies
an 'intelligible'16 relation between subjects with regard to external
objects of their choice. In so far as property rights presuppose
others' justified exclusion from use of external objects of a person's
choice, a rightful claim to external possession presupposes others'
acknowledgement of its rightfulness as the ground of its legitimacy.
However, Kant's rejection of a natural or innate right to private
property does not make him a consensus theorist on property
rights. While a rightful claim to private property presupposes
others' assent, others are required to assent to its rightfulness in
accordance with a universally valid law. This is because the concept
of external freedom itself implies a claim to external objects of
one's choice.17
The relation between innate Right and acquired Right in the
Rechtslehre is thus complex and unusual. Clearly, the innate right
to freedom does not cover all aspects of a person's rightful exercise
of their external freedom: it covers relations between subjects in
their inter-subjective external dealings with one another, but not
relations between subjects with regard to external objects of their
6 KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007
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respective choices. I shall now make a simplifying assumption. I
shall assume that the universal principle of Right as it is stated in
the introduction covers only persons' innate Right to freedom
(their inner suum). It does not (yet) extend to relations of external
mine and yours.18 The extension of the universal principle of Right
to the category of acquired Right then becomes the central prob-
lematic of part 1 of the Rechtslehre. According to Kant, the
possibility of such an extension depends on the possibility of 'a
synthetic a priori proposition of Right'.19 Such a synthetic a priori
proposition of Right, which includes what Kant calls the concept
of intelligible possession, or of 'merely rightful possession',20 is in
need of a deduction. The task of chapter 1 of part 1 of the
Rechtslehre is to supply such a deduction. It is in connection with
the 'deduction of the concept of merely rightful possession' that
Kant introduces the 'postulate of practical reason with regard to
Right':
It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine,
that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of my
choice would in itself (objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius)
is contrary to Right.21
I shall not here examine the complicated relation between postu-
late and deduction.22 Instead I shall focus only on the postulate of
Right itself, which can be considered from two perspectives. First,
one might examine the postulate in terms of its function in the
context of Kant's property argument. Here one will find that the
postulate functions as a justificatory proposition which, in
declaring external possession to be possible, makes entrance into
civil society obligatory. Kant says that the postulate of Right 'gives
us an authorization that could not be got from mere concepts of
Right as such' - the authorization, namely, to take into possession
external objects of our choice.23 But in so far as rightful possession
is possible only under the presupposition of the concept of intelli-
gible possession, which is itself possible only in the civil
condition,24 our authorized unilateral act of acquisition effectively
obliges all others to join into civil society with us. The postulate is
thus crucial not only to Kant's property argument but also to his
account of political obligation in general.
However, it is also possible to consider the postulate of Right
from a second perspective. One can consider it in terms of its status
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as a postulate of practical reason. Considered from that perspec-
tive, the postulate constitutes a practically necessary but
theoretically indemonstrable proposition of practical reason. Kant
says that 'there is no way of proving of itself the postulate's prop-
osition that external possession is possible.25 He insists that 'the
theoretical principles of external objects that are mine and yours
get lost in the intelligible and represent no extension of know-
ledge'.26 What is of interest in the present context is the conjunction
of these two perspectives. Considered in conjunction they yield a
characterization of the postulate of Right as a practically necessary
justificatory proposition the grounds of which remain theoretically
indemonstrable for us. This characterization of the postulate
implies that our knowledge of the grounds of our juridical obliga-
tions towards one another is ultimately very limited: these grounds
'get lost in the intelligible'. We can acknowledge that we stand
under obligations of Right towards one another, but we cannot ulti-
mately know why this should be the case.
As already indicated above, Guyer's interpretation entails a
denial of these conclusions. This is because Guyer substitutes an
acknowledgement of the postulate's theoretical indemonstrability
with a notion of its practical provability. The effect of this move is
to render the postulate's theoretical indemonstrability practically
insignificant. My aim in the remainder of this paper is to defend,
against Guyer, the practical significance, for us, of the juridical
postulate's theoretical indemonstrability. I shall contest Guyer's
reading on systematic grounds (section 4) as well as on substantive
grounds (section 5). However, before turning to an analysis of the
postulate of Right itself, I shall set out, in the next section, the
difference between practical provability, as conceived by Guyer,
and practical justification, as I understand it, in relation to the
postulates of practical reason in general.
3. Practical Proof or Practical Justification?
Kant's general conception of the postulates of practical reason is
indebted to his view of mathematical postulates on the one hand
and to his critique of rationalist metaphysics in the Transcendental
Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason on the other hand.
According to L. W. Beck, Kant regards a mathematical postulate as
8 KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007
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'an indemonstrable practical (i.e. technically practical) proposition
giving a rule for the synthesis of an object in intuition, when the
possibility of the object is known a priori'.27 The postulate supplies
the rule for a mathematical proof but remains indemonstrable
itself. The notion of indemonstrability recurs in relation to the
postulates of practical reason, where it refers, however, to a postu-
late's theoretical proposition. The Critique of Practical Reason
defines a postulate of practical reason as 'a theoretical proposition
which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable
corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law'.28
More specifically, a postulate is a theoretical proposition, the truth
content of which is neither provable nor refutable as such. From a
theoretical perspective, postulates constitute infinite or problem-
atic judgements for us: we are incapable, in principle, of judging
their propositional contents to be either true or false.29 However,
since there is nothing contradictory about the logical form of these
propositions, Kant thinks our appeal to them permissible within
the domain of practical reason.30
Technically, postulates of practical reason help resolve a conflict
or antinomy of practical reason. In the second Critique, they resolve
the conflict between the moral ends of pure practical reason, which
we acknowledge, and the limitation of our human sensibility,
which constrain us with regard to our possible achievement of
these ends.31 Morally, the postulates' necessity is foreshadowed in
Kant's references to the ideas of pure reason in the Transcendental
Dialectic. While Kant there concludes that we are not entitled to
claim objective knowledge of the existence of God or of the immor-
tality of the soul, he acknowledges that the ideas of God and of
immortality are practically indispensable to finite rational beings
like us.32 In the Critique of Practical Reason these ideas are articu-
lated in the form of two postulates which supply the necessary
theoretical presuppositions to the practical possibility of the idea of
the highest good. As practically necessary theoretical propositions
they represent not 'theoretical dogmas but presuppositions of
necessarily practical import'. They 'do not extend speculative
knowledge', although they do 'give objective reality to the Ideas of
speculative reason'.33 The postulates are thus 'corollaries of a need
of reason',34 which articulate an 'objectively insufficient' but
'subjectively sufficient' reasoned faith (Vernunftglaube) in the
possible existence of the postulated objects. Considered from a
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theoretical perspective, the postulates are 'secrets',35 because cogni-
tively inaccessible to us. Yet from a practical perspective, their
theoretical indemonstrability in no way detracts from the practical
necessity of our subjective assent to them.
In these descriptions of the postulates of practical reason the
emphasis on the feature of their theoretical indemonstrability is
immediately tempered by assurances that the fact of their practical
necessity makes up, in some sense, for their lack of theoretical
provability. Kant's view seems to be that the practical necessity of
assenting to the postulates' theoretical propositions in itself
amounts to a justification of sorts of their validity for us. Though
theoretically indemonstrable, the postulates are practically justifi-
able on the grounds of our practically necessary appeal to them.
Kant's distinction between Wissen and Glauben provides an indi-
cation of what he takes to be the difference between theoretical
proof and practical justification. According to Allen Wood,
Kant defines 'knowledge' (Wissen) as the holding of a proposition that
is sufficient both objectively and subjectively, whereas 'faith' or 'belief
(Glaube) is sufficient only subjectively, not objectively. But faith as
much as knowledge is justified by reasons that 'hold for everyone'; in
this respect it is distinguished from mere 'opinion' (Meinung), which is
insufficient subjectively as well as objectively.36
In so far as a postulate is a Vernunftglaube, it is distinct from both
knowledge and opinion. Although the subjectively valid reasons
proffered in behalf of a postulate fall short of theoretical cognition,
a postulate is not held idiosyncratically or capriciously but is based
on a 'need of reason' which is valid for everyone. To say that a
Vernunftglaube is 'subjectively valid' is thus not to say that holding
it is a matter of individual caprice: it is to say that the reasons for
such a belief, while not sufficient for a claim to knowledge, have
practical warrant - they justify our assent to the postulates on
practical grounds.
The objective of a practical justification differs, however, from
that of a theoretical proof. This is best illustrated with reference to
the postulate of the existence of God, in the case of which 'object-
ively sufficient reasons' would require an 'intellectual intuition' of
God's existence.37 Since we are incapable, in principle, of this kind
of intuition, a theoretical proof of the postulate of the existence of
God is unavailable to us. By contrast, a practical justification of the
10 KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007
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postulate of the existence of God appeals to subjectively sufficient,
that is, practical reasons. These do not pertain to the truth of a
postulate's theoretical proposition but to subjects' practical rela-
tion to that proposition. Hence a practical justification of the
postulate of the existence of God shows only that we have suffi-
cient practical reason, arising from a need of reason, for assenting
to the proposition of God's existence. On this account, to assent,
on practical grounds, to a postulate's theoretical proposition is not
to raise any cognitive claims regarding its objective content. To
believe, on practical grounds, in the existence of God is not to
claim knowledge of God's existence. To the contrary, for Kant, the
justifiability of practical faith in the existence of God presupposes
an acknowledgement of the indemonstrability of the actuality of
His existence. If a practically justified faith in the existence of God
is to avoid slipping back into dogmatic assertion, it must not be
conflated with knowledge of the actuality of God's existence.38 Only
an explicit recognition of the unanswerability, in principle, of the
question of the actuality of God's existence ensures avoidance of this
confusion. In this sense, practically justified assent to the postulate
of the existence of God presupposes an acknowledgement of the
proposition's theoretical indemonstrability. Strictly speaking, we
should affirm only our justified faith in the possibility of God's
existence, or our justified belief in the idea of His existence.
Guyer's account of practical provability can be distinguished
from the notion of practical justifiability just sketched in that
Guyer does raise certain cognitive claims in relation to the postu-
lates' propositional contents. Guyer says of the postulates of
practical reason that they are 'a matter for practical rather than
theoretical cognition. Kant does not intend to imply that the princi-
ples admit of no proof at all, but rather to say something about the
kind of proof of which they do admit'.39 In calling postulates a
matter for practical cognition Guyer invokes 'a kind of proof that
is weaker than a theoretical proof; however, his calling it a matter
of cognition indicates that he is after something stronger than prac-
tical justification. This impression is confirmed by Guyer's
subsequent definition of a postulate of practical reason as an
'existential proposition [that is] theoretical in form but connected
with a moral law or command'.40 More specifically, a postulate is
'a theoretical proposition asserting the existence of an object or
state of affairs that is a condition of the possibility of the binding
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007 11
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force of a moral command'.41 Both times Guyer's formulations
emphasize the objective (existential) content of the postulates'
theoretical propositions; indeed, when he moves to consider the
postulate of the existence of God, a practical proof of the actuality
of God's existence turns out to be his principal concern. The postu-
late of the existence of God, Guyer says, arises in connection with
the command to effect the practical realization of the Highest
Good. What Guyer refers to as the 'real possibility' of the Highest
Good depends upon the 'actual existence' of God as its ultimate
condition.42 Given that it is the object of a moral command, the
practical realization of the Highest Good must be a real possibility.
But if the actuality of God's existence is the ultimate condition of
the real possibility of the Highest Good, the practical realization of
which is itself the object of a binding moral command, we are enti-
tled to infer the actuality of God's existence from our moral
obligation to realize the Highest Good. We are entitled to 'affirm
on moral grounds the theoretical proposition asserting the exis-
tence of God'.43
On this account, we infer the truth of the postulate's theoretical
proposition - the actuality of God's existence - from the practical
evidence we have in support of His existence. This is clearly
different from a practical justification of the postulate of the exis-
tence of God. A practical justification does not seek to establish the
truth of a postulate's propositional content. It does not, therefore,
treat the command to effect the practical realization of the Highest
Good as practical evidence from which to infer the actuality of
God's existence. A practical justification holds only that, in so far
as we are under a moral obligation to bring about the Highest
Good, and in so far as the real possibility of the Highest Good does
depend on the existence of God, we have sufficient practical
reasons for assenting to the postulate's proposition of God's exis-
tence. But these reasons do not pertain to the truth of the
postulate's propositional content. They pertain to the practical
necessity of our assenting to that proposition.
I am not sure how cogent Guyer's account of practical prov-
ability in fact is in relation to the second Critique postulates. It is
not clear to me that practical cognition of the actuality of God's
existence can be distinguished from theoretical cognition of His
existence. If we are entitled to claim knowledge of the actuality of
God's existence in the domain of practical reason, I am not sure
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how we could simultaneously be obliged to deny such knowledge
in the domain of theoretical reason. Nor is it clear to me how
Guyer's account of the practical provability of the actuality of
God's existence is supposed to fit in with his descriptions elsewhere
of the postulates of practical reason as 'naturally occurring psycho-
logical illusions' and as 'products of human psychology that can be
used by the moral will as naturally occurring means to the realisa-
tion of a morally necessary end'.44 However, neither the cogency of
Guyer's notion of practical provability nor its consistency with his
general conception of the practical postulates are at issue here. At
issue is only the difference between practical provability and prac-
tical justification in relation to the postulates' theoretical
indemonstrability. Here we can conclude that whilst practical justi-
fication is conceptually distinct from theoretical provability,
practical provability is modelled on theoretical provability.
Furthermore, while the objective of a practical justification is to
provide warrant for subjects' practically grounded assent to a
postulate's theoretical proposition, the objective of a practical
proof aims to provide evidence of the truth of a postulate's propo-
sitional content. Finally, while practical justifiability considers
subjects' acknowledgement of a postulate's theoretical indemon-
strability indispensable to their proper assessment of its practical
significance for them, practical provability seeks to replace the
non-available theoretical proof with the available practical proof.
The next section considers these respective conceptions of practical
provability and of practical justifiability in relation to the postulate
of Right.
4. The Postulate of Right: Practical Proof or Practical
Justification?
4.a. A practical proof of the postulate
Surprisingly, Guyer's forcefully stated defence of postulates' prac-
tical provability in the first half of his paper appears to have little,
if any, bearing upon his subsequent analysis of the postulate of
Right. This is not to say that practical provability plays no role in
that analysis; however, it seems to take on a rather different
meaning. This shift in the meaning of practical provability may be
a consequence of Guyer's reading of the postulate of Right as
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containing a practical, not a theoretical proposition. His reading of
it as a practical proposition is a consequence, in turn, of a misinter-
pretation of the relation between the juridical postulate and the
universal principle of Right. In the first half of the present section I
examine Guyer's practical proof of the postulate and shall say what
I think is wrong with it. In the second half I turn to an analysis of
the postulate in terms of the notion of practical justifiability.
To begin with, recall the postulate itself:
It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine,
that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of my
choice would in itself (objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius)
is contrary to Right.45
For present purposes it suffices to read the postulate as asserting
that it is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as
mine and that any law to the contrary would itself be contrary to
Right. The question is a) what conception of external mine is being
proposed here? and b) which is that law that would be 'contrary to
Right' relative to external mine/yours relations? To answer the first
part of the question we must return to the distinction between
empirical possession and intelligible possession; the answer to the
second part requires a further look at the universal principle of
Right. Recall the above simplifying assumption, according to
which the universal principle of Right extends, as it stands, only to
persons' inner suum: it regulates the innate right to freedom of
each. This innate right includes persons' bodily integrity but not a
right to external possessions. As it stands, therefore, the universal
principle of Right can recognize what Kant calls 'empirical posses-
sion' - the physical holding of an object.46 On the conception of
empirical possession, I can call an external object mine so long as I
am physically attached to it, such as when I hold an apple in my
hand, for example. Here my innate right to physical integrity
extends to the apple: were someone to wrest the apple from my
hand, they would be acting contrary to Right since their action
would constitute an attack on my bodily integrity.47 Strictly speaking,
however, the universal principle of Right as it stands cannot extend
to genuine relations of external mine and yours. It cannot cover a
type of possession whereby the object could be said to be mine
even when it is not physically attached to me. Such a conception
of an object that is genuinely mine externally - mine apart from
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any physical attachment to myself - is possible only on a concep-
tion of intelligible possession. Here the connection between
myself and the object of my choice would be non-physical, hence
intelligible: it would be 'possession of an object without holding
it'.48
It is clear that in so far as Kant thinks of rightful possession as
presupposing the conception of intelligible possession, he conceives
of property rights as specifying relations between subjects with
regard to external objects of (someone's) choice. To possess an
object without holding it is to be recognized as its rightful owner
by others even when the object is 'apart from one'. Property rights
cannot, therefore, simply constitute an extension of a person's
innate right to freedom. Since the universal principle of Right as it
stands covers only relations of innate Right, it cannot countenance
property rights in the proper sense of the term, that is, as rights in
objects apart from one. This is why the universal principle of Right
requires an 'a priori extension'.49 This extension is supplied by the
postulate of Right. When the postulate asserts that it is possible for
me to have any external object of my choice as mine, it must be
taken to be presupposing the conception of intelligible possession.
But in presupposing the conception of intelligible possession, the
postulate is simultaneously proclaiming the universal principle of
Right as it stands as deficient in relation to the question of external
mine and yours.
Crucially, Guyer's analysis of the juridical postulate fails to
acknowledge its problematic relation to the universal principle of
Right. Guyer recognizes the distinction between innate Right and
acquired Right: he emphasizes that while the former is analytic, the
latter is based on a synthetic a priori proposition of Right. Despite
this, Guyer fails to see that the universal principle of Right cannot
as it stands endorse the category of acquired Right. Far from
viewing the postulate as an extension of the universal principle of
Right, Guyer believes that 'the so-called postulate of acquired
Right must itself be derivable from the [universal] principle of
Right'.50
Guyer observes, correctly, that the universal principle of Right
constitutes the general law of external freedom. He points out,
again correctly, that a person's use of their external freedom
implies their claim to exclusive use of external objects of their
choice. If exclusive use were not possible 'freedom would be
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depriving itself of the use of its choice with regard to an object of
choice'.51 From these two observations Guyer concludes that in so
far as the universal principle of Right endorses the exercise of one's
freedom so long as it is consistent with everyone else's freedom,
and in so far as the exercise of one's freedom implies a claim to
exclusive use of external objects of one's choice, a claim to external
possession must be compatible with the equal exercise of their
freedom by everyone else. The claim to external possessions must
be consistent, in other words, with the universal principle of Right.
This is corroborated by the juridical postulate's assertion that
external possession is possible. Guyer views the postulate's asser-
tion that external possession is possible as simply an entailment of
the claim that under the universal principle of Right such posses-
sion must be possible. However, if the assertion that external
possession is possible does indeed follow from the claim that it
must be possible, it is difficult to see what precisely is left to be
proven. Guyer's strategy of argumentation becomes very murky at
this point. However, we can perhaps understand him as saying that
the proof of the validity or truth of the postulate's assertion that
external possession is possible consists in a demonstration of how
or under what conditions this is possible. Guyer says that the proof
of the postulate takes the form of 'an extended demonstration that
the conditions for the possibility of rightful acquisition of property
can be satisfied in our relations to physical objects and to each
other in space and time'.52 This proof of the practical realizability
of external possession comprises of three elements: a demonstra-
tion of the 'moral possibility' of property rights, a demonstration
of their 'theoretical possibility', and a demonstration of their 'prac-
tical necessity'.53 I shall quickly run through each of these three
steps.
Demonstration of the 'moral possibility' of property departs from
the observation that the concept of property rights specifies a rela-
tion between subjects with regard to objects. From this Guyer infers
that the moral possibility of property rights depends on the possi-
bility of intersubjective assent. 'Since a property right restricts the
freedom of others who might also have been able to use the object in
question, such a right can be rightfully acquired only under condi-
tions in which all could freely and rationally agree to the individual
acquisition of the right.'54 So here the moral possibility of external
possession is said to depend on the possibility of free and rational
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assent by each. The possibility of such assent is represented, Guyer
claims, in Kant's 'idea of a general united will'.55 In accordance with
this idea individuals can agree on the mutual securement of one
another's claims to external possession. Kant's references to the idea
of a general united will in accordance with which individuals can
reach actual agreement regarding property rights thus constitutes
'proof of the moral possibility of such rights.
Proof of the 'theoretical possibility' of property rights 'appeals to
the spatio-temporal features of our existence'.56 Here Guyer has
recourse to two possible modes of acquisition identified in chapter
two of the Rechtslehre: 'original acquisition', which Guyer glosses
as 'first appropriation of a property', and 'derivative acquisition',
which results from 'a rightful transfer of the property from one
owner to the other'.57 While the latter is legitimate because based
on mutual consent, the legitimation of original acquisition is
more problematic. Even though it is 'not derived from what is
another's',58 the legitimacy of this type of acquisition, too, depends
on others' possible assent. To get around this difficulty Guyer
invokes Kant's 'idea of original possession in common',59 which
'enables us to conceive of [original acquisition] as a transfer of an
original rightful possession of the undivided commons to a rightful
possession of a divided portion of the whole'.60 So we can think of
original acquisition in terms of a collective agreement to divide
what was originally held in common. Nothing about the spatio-
temporal conditions of our existence prevents us from proceeding
in this manner: and this, it seems, constitutes sufficient proof of the
theoretical possibility of external possession.
The first two aspects of the proof are intended to show that
external possession is 'morally possible' in so far as everyone can
freely agree to its institution under the idea of a general united will,
and that it is 'theoretically possible' in so far as existing empirical
conditions do not militate against the implementation of such a
scheme. The third step shows that rightful external possession is
'morally necessary'. External possession is morally necessary,
Guyer says, because 'the psychological and physical conditions of
our existence are such that we inevitably will attempt to claim
property rights in circumstances where that will bring us into
conflict with others. [Given this] we have a duty to claim such
rights with an eye to the civil condition and in turn to bring about
that civil condition.'61
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A general difficulty with Guyer's approach lies in the fact that his
'extended demonstration' dilutes the systematic function of the
postulate within the property argument. Guyer delivers not so
much a proof of the postulate as a general reconstruction of Kant's
property argument, which conflates aspects of Kant's theory of
possession with elements from his theory of acquisition - compo-
nents of the account of acquired Right which Kant himself keeps
distinct. A related difficulty lies in Guyer's persistent tendency to
empiricize Kant's argument - this is especially noticeable in relation
to the second and third elements of his proof, which make the
validity of the postulate's proposition dependent on spatio-
temporal and psychological conditions. Finally, Guyer's excessive
reliance on Kant's preliminary notes in favour of the published text
itself is disconcerting not least because the postulate, as the 'theor-
etical novum' of the published text, is not discussed in the
unpublished notes.62 Remarkably, Guyer's proof strategy has no
recourse at all to the postulate's proposition.
However, the principal difficulty with Guyer's strategy lies in the
fact that his analysis of the relation between the universal principle
of Right and unilateral claims to property renders redundant any
appeal to a postulate. Recall the technical function of a postulate of
practical reason mentioned in section 2 above. A postulate is meant
to resolve a conflict of practical reason with itself by reconciling
two otherwise contradictory propositions of practical reason.
From this perspective, the problem with Guyer's account is that
there simply is no conflict between innate Right and acquired
Right; nor does Guyer mention the conflict between the claim to
external possession on the one hand and the constraints of the
universal principle of Right on the other hand. For Guyer, the
postulate of Right is derivable from the universal principle of
Right, but in that case the postulate takes us no further, in justifica-
tory terms, than the universal principle of Right. Far from making
possible the a priori extension of the universal principle of Right,
the validity of the postulate becomes a function of its fit with that
principle. Yet if the postulate is derivable from the universal prin-
ciple of Right, it is not at all clear why the proposition in question
should be characterized as a postulate of practical reason at all: as
a theoretical proposition, which asserts what is (or must be taken
to be) the case in order for something else to be morally possible.
Of course, once the juridical postulate fails to be treated as a
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practically necessary theoretical proposition, it is difficult to see in
what sense the proof just sketched constitutes an instance of
Guyer's general notion of practical provability at all.
I want to demonstrate this latter difficulty in Guyer's approach
with reference to the first and most important element of his proof,
according to which the 'moral possibility' of the postulate's propo-
sition depends on the free and rational agreement of all to a system
of property rights under the idea of a general united will. The ques-
tion is this: does the validity of the postulate's proposition that
external possession is possible depend on the possibility of the idea
of the general united will? Or is the validity of the postulate a
necessary presupposition of the possibility of the idea of a general
united will? On Guyer's earlier account of practical provability we
should come away with the latter conclusion. However, the actual
proof he delivers of the postulate's practical possibility entails the
former conclusion. To see this, recall Guyer's characterization of a
postulate of practical reason as 'a theoretical proposition asserting
the existence of an object or state of affairs that is a condition of
the possibility of the binding force of a moral command'.63
According to Guyer's initial account of practical provability a prac-
tical proof infers the truth of a postulate's theoretical proposition
from practical evidence advanced in support of its truth, where the
practical evidence in question is the moral necessity of acting in
accordance with a moral command. On this account the juridical
postulate should be read as affirming a theoretical proposition,
which constitutes the condition of the binding force of a moral
command, where the binding force of that command functions as
practical evidence for the truth of its necessary theoretical presup-
position. Assuming that the moral command in question is
entrance into civil society (the idea of a general united will), we
should infer the truth of the juridical postulate's theoretical propo-
sition, 'external possession is possible', from the fact that it
constitutes the condition of the possibility of the idea of a general
united will (entrance into civil society). Only if the postulate's theor-
etical proposition is true is the idea of a general united will
practically realizable. Since, as the object of a moral command,
this idea must be practically realizable the postulate's theoretical
proposition must be true. This is not the argument Guyer in fact
delivers: to the contrary, Guyer argues the other way around when
he says that the 'moral possibility' of the postulate is conditional
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upon the possibility of free and rational agreement to its propos-
ition under the idea of a general united will. According to this
argument, the postulate does not constitute the condition of the
practical realizability of the general united will. Instead the validity
of the postulate's proposition that external possession is possible is
said to be conditional upon the possibility of the idea of the general
united will.
At this point one may object that, whatever the merits of Guyer's
initial account of practical provability, it is hardly surprising that it
fails to apply to the postulate of Right. This is because it is difficult
to see in what sense that postulate can plausibly be construed as a
theoretical proposition at all. For one thing, the juridical postu-
late's provenance does not lie in the ideas of pure reason discussed
in the Transcendental Dialectic: it does not refer to or invoke any
non-sensible object or state of affairs. Instead, it refers to subjects'
possible acquisition of external objects, to maxims and to a law of
practical reason. The juridical postulate's propositional content
thus appears to be of a practical rather than a theoretical nature.64
All this may indeed appear to be the case. On the other hand, the
form of the postulate's proposition is assertoric, not imperatival: 'it
is possible', not 'it must/ought to be possible'. Moreover, having
stated the postulate's proposition that external possession is
possible, Kant goes on to say that the 'theoretical principles' of
mine/thine relations 'lose themselves in intelligible grounds'.65
More specifically, 'we cannot show how intelligible possession is
possible, and so how it is possible for something external to be
mine or yours, but must infer it from the postulate of practical
reason'.66 The remarks suggest that some indemonstrable theoret-
ical principles do underlie the postulate's proposition that external
possession is possible. Rather than pass over Kant's admonish-
ments about their theoretical indemonstrability without mention,
we should ask what these theoretical principles might be. Once we
do raise this question, the uniqueness of the postulate's justificatory
function in relation to Kant's property argument will come into
better focus. This is what I shall try to show in the following.
4.b. A practical justification of the postulate
As we have seen, Kant rejects the view according to which a
rightful claim to external possession can be derived from the innate
right to freedom of each. Property rights specify a relation between
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subjects with regard to external objects of possible choice; they
thus presuppose the conception of intelligible possession. Since the
conception of intelligible possession specifies an intelligible relation
between persons, the right to external possession cannot be derived
from the innate right of each. This implies that, according to the
innate right of each, external possession is not possible. According
to the innate right of each, all subjects have a right to empirical
possession of all objects and none has a right to exclusive posses-
sion of any object. It follows that the unilateral acquisition and
exclusive use of an object of choice would be contrary to the
universal principle of Right as it stands (as it stands, the universal
principle of Right covers, on my simplifying assumption, only rela-
tions of innate right). At the same time Kant accepts that a person's
claim to external possessions is a corollary of their right to external
freedom of choice and action: to exercise this right just is to lay
claim to external objects of one's choice. If external possession
were not possible, freedom would 'be depriving itself of the use of
its choice with regard to an object of choice'.67 The result is an
antinomy of Right. On the one hand, exclusive possession of
external cannot be rightful, as it would entail a unilateral curtail-
ment of everyone else's innate right to freedom. On the other hand,
exclusive possession of external objects must be rightful since
without it external freedom is not possible.68 It is this conflict of
Right, which the postulate resolves by affirming that:
It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine,
that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of
choice would in itself (objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius)
is contrary to Right. 69
On the face of it, this solution consists in an arbitrary assertion
of the rightfulness of unilateral acquisition. Yet Kant claims that
the postulate provides an a priori extension of the universal prin-
ciple of Right. This implies that although external possession is not
(yet) in accordance with the universal principle of Right as it
stands, it is possible for this to become the case. In other words, the
postulate introduces the possibility of rightful possession - posses-
sion in accordance with the universal principles of Right - by
extending that principle to relations between subjects with regard
to external objects. The postulate, Kant says,
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can be called a permissive principle (lex permissiva) of practical reason,
which gives us an authorisation that could not be got from mere
concepts of Right as such, namely to put all others under an obligation,
which they would not otherwise have, to refrain from using certain
objects of our choice because we have been the first to take them into
our possession. Reason wills that this hold as a principle, and it does
this as practical reason, which extends itself a priori by this postulate of
reason.70
According to this passage, I am authorized to put others under
an obligation to refrain from using objects of my choice simply
because 'I have been the first to take them into possession'. This
authorization 'could not be got from mere concepts of Right'. The
postulate's authorization thus appears to exceed the bounds of
the universal principle of Right. This seems itself problematic.
The universal principle of Right constitutes the external version of
the categorical imperative: the categorical imperative is the
supreme principle of morality. On what grounds could I possibly
be authorized to violate a prohibition of the universal principle of
Right as the external version of the supreme principle of morality?
Here Reinhard Brandt's influential analysis of the postulate as a
permissive law (lex permissiva) proves illuminating. According to
Brandt, the categorical imperative recognizes two kinds of impera-
tives in relation to action: morally required acts and morally
prohibited acts. As a permissive law, the juridical postulate fits into
neither class. How, then, is one to understand the relation between
the postulate and the universal principle of Right? Brandt proposes
to treat the lex permissiva of the Rechtslehre as a kind of
Ausnahmegesetz — as an extraordinary law which mediates
between a general prohibition and a general prescription. The
postulate mediates between the prohibition against taking external
objects of one's choice into one's exclusive possession - a prohib-
ition grounded in the innate right of each - and the requirement to
acknowledge the claims of each to exclusive possession of external
objects of their choice - a requirement grounded in the concept of
external freedom itself. The postulate extraordinarily authorizes
the commission of an action that is morally prohibited (the unilat-
eral restriction of the innate right to freedom of each) in order to
make possible an action that is itself morally required (the
acknowledgement of the rightfulness of external possession).
However, this authorization is itself conditional upon subjects'
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entrance into the civil condition as the only condition within which
property rights, as specifying an intelligible relation between
subjects with regard to objects, are strictly speaking rightful.71
I have analysed and elaborated Brandt's interpretation of the
postulate's justificatory function in relation to the problem of
property rights in some detail elsewhere.72 Here a summary expo-
sition will have to suffice. Let us say that the postulate
extraordinarily and provisionally authorizes my unilaterial acqui-
sition of an external object of my choice. This act constitutes an
incursion into the innate freedom of all others, who are now
excluded from use of that object. Yet without such an act of
unilateral acquisition freedom of choice and action itself would
not be possible. Although the act of unilateral acquisition does
constitute an incursion into the innate right to freedom of each,
rightful external possession must be possible if external freedom
of choice and action is to be possible. But rightful external posses-
sion specifies a relation between subjects with regard to external
objects: rightful possession presupposes the conception of intelli-
gible possession. Yet the conception of intelligible possession is
possible only in the civil condition. If, therefore, rightful posses-
sion presupposes the conception of intelligible possession, and if
intelligible possession is possible only in the civil condition, then
my act of unilateral acquisition authorized by the postulate can
count as rightful only in so far as it can be taken as the expression
of my intention to enter with all others into the civil condition.
But it must be taken as the expression of that intention, since the
act could not otherwise count as rightful. If it could not count as
rightful, I could not be authorized to put others under an obliga-
tion to refrain from using the objects of his choice. But where my
act of unilateral acquisition does proceed in accordance with the
postulate's authorization of it - where it does express the intention
to enter with all others into the civil condition - all others are also
required to assent to that intention. According to the postulate,
therefore, external possession is possible because entrance into the
civil condition is obligatory. The postulate wills subjects' entrance
into the civil condition by provisionally authorizing an act of
unilateral acquisition which, to qualify as rightful, must be inter-
preted as the expression of the intention to enter into the civil
condition as that condition alone within which external posses-
sion can be rightful.
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Although Brandt's interpretation has recently come under attack
by a number of interpreters according to whom Kant's use of the
concept of a permissive law remains much closer to that of trad-
itional natural law theory than Brandt allows, his account remains
in my view one of the most systematic and compelling reconstruc-
tions of Kant's justificatory strategy.73 However, my principal
concern in the present context is to argue that if one does accept
the postulate's justificatory function as an extraordinary, permis-
sive law, one must take seriously the indemonstrability of the
source of its authorization. For although the postulate resolves the
conflict of practical reason in relation to Right by provisionally
authorising an act of unilateral acquisition which in turn generates
the obligation to enter into the civil condition with all others, Kant
insists that 'there is no way of proving of itself the possibility of
[merely rightful] possession or of having any insight into it. No one
need be surprised that theoretical principles about external objects
that are mine or yours get lost in the intelligible and represent no
extension of knowledge'.74 At this juncture we return to Guyer's
difficulty in construing the postulate as a theoretical proposition.
The difficulty lies in understanding what could possibly be meant
by 'the theoretical principles' of external mine and yours. As I said,
in contrast to the postulates of the existence of God and of the
immortality of the soul the postulate of Right refers to no non-
sensible object or idea of pure reason the existence of which it
asserts on practical grounds. The juridical postulate is not, or does
not appear to be, the expression of a knowledge-transcending
Vernunftglaube (practical faith). Instead, it affirms the possibility
of a particular juridical relation between subjects in space and
time. Given this, the surprise is not so much that the theoretical
principles of external mine and yours 'get lost in the intelligible' as
that there should be any such theoretical principles at all.
The meaning of Kant's references to the postulate's indemonstra-
bility may become clearer once the focus turns to the source of its
authorization. Kant says that the postulate gives us an authoriza-
tion, and he adds that it is reason itself, which wills the postulate. It
thus appears to be reason itself, which constitutes the source of the
authorization issued by the postulate. But what does it mean to say
that 'reason' authorizes the acquisition of external objects of one's
choice? In order to clarify what this may mean it will help to
consider what it cannot mean. I said above that the postulate
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authorizes my unilateral acquisition of an external object of my
choice as the expression of my intention to join with all others into
the civil condition. This does not mean that I have any choice with
regard to my intentions in this matter. It is not contingent that I
raise a claim to external possession. Nor is it contingent that I
commit an act of unilateral acquisition. I must raise the claim and
must commit the act in virtue of my standing as a free agent: if I did
not raise the claim/commit the act, external freedom itself would
be impossible. Nor is it contingent that I have the intention to enter
into the civil condition with all others: I must (be taken to) have
that intention given that my act of unilateral acquisition expresses
a claim to rightful possession, and given that rightful possession is
possible only in the civil condition. Throughout, the postulate's
authorization expresses the fact of moral compulsion. I could not
choose not to commit the act and not to have the intention. But if I
could not choose not to have that intention, I cannot be the author-
izing source of that intention. Hence I am not the author of my
obligation to enter civil society.
Who or what, then, is the authorizing authority? The author-
izing authority is the idea of freedom. Kant says that no one need
be surprised that the theoretical principles about external objects
that are mine or yours get lost in the intelligible because 'no the-
oretical deduction can be given for the possibility of the concept of
freedom on which they are based'.75 The theoretical principles of
external mine and yours are based on the idea of freedom. But the
idea of freedom is itself a theoretically incomprehensible postulate
of practical reason. Hence to say that my standing as free agent is
itself the source of the postulate's authorization is not to say that I
am the source of that authorization after all. I am not the source of
my freedom: its source lies beyond the limits of my possible
comprehension. Consider, in this respect, the postulate's extension
of my juridical perspective: I raise a claim to external possession
and find myself obligated to join into civil society with all others.
This is more than I had bargained for when initially raising my
claim. Yet, in obliging me to enter into the civil condition with all
others, the postulate effects a qualitative change in relations among
subjects, who now bear civic responsibilities towards one
another.76 It is reason, not the subjects themselves, which wills their
entrance into civil society. Reason wills this as practical reason,
that is, in accordance with the idea of freedom. Yet although we
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can acknowledge that we do, as beings who cannot but think of
themselves as free, stand under obligations of Right towards one
another, we have no insight at all into the theoretical grounds of
our obligations. In so far as it derives from the idea of freedom
itself, the fact of our juridical obligations towards one another is,
as such, a theoretically incomprehensible 'fact of reason'.
5. The moral significance of the postulate's theoretical
indemonstrability
Section 3 distinguished between practical provability and practical
justification in relation to the postulates of practical reason in
general. I suggested that while the latter seeks to offer practical
warrant for subjects' practically necessary assent to a postulate's
theoretical proposition, the former aims to provide practical
evidence for the truth of its propositional content. Section 4
applied the distinction to the postulate of Right. In the second half
of that section, I argued that a case can be made for the postulate's
practical justifiability, which acknowledges the moral significance
of its theoretical indemonstrability. I also argued, in the first half of
section 4, that Guyer himself slips from claims about the practical
provability of postulates' theoretical propositions to a practical
proof of what he construes, in effect, as a practical proposition of
Right. This slippage does not mean that there is no connection
between Guyer's two divergent accounts of practical provability. In
both cases, Guyer's principal concern is to reduce the threat he
perceives the postulates' theoretical indemonstrability to pose to
our sense of moral certainty regarding the grounds of our obliga-
tions. It is, I believe, this perceived threat which initially motivates
Guyer's forceful response to Willaschek's denial of the juridical
postulate's provability. It is also this quest for moral certainty
which leads him to overlook the discontinuity between the two
accounts of practical provability he provides. Thus, whatever the
differences between the two proof strategies he offers, their shared
concern is the elimination of the perceived potential of the postu-
lates' theoretical indemonstrability to undermine our moral
confidence. In this final section I want to suggest that the juridical
postulate's theoretical indemonstrability poses no threat to our
understanding of our standing as moral subjects. To the contrary, it
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may deepen that understanding. To this purpose, I want briefly to
elaborate on the connection between the postulate of Right and the
postulate of freedom.
Given its function as the ground of the possibility of the moral
law Kant assigns the idea of freedom a special status compared to
the other postulates of practical reason. Nonetheless, when he does
speak of freedom as a postulate of practical reason, he emphasizes
its theoretical indemonstrability. He also insists upon the practical
significance of our acknowledgement of its theoretical indemon-
strability. On the one hand, we can have as little theoretical insight
into reason's capacity to 'frame its own order of ideas'77 as we have
into the possibility of reason's independence from the causality of
nature. On the other hand, although 'we do not comprehend the
practical unconditioned necessity of the supreme law of freedom,
we do comprehend its incomprehensibility'.78 When we do, we
think of ourselves, in our 'practical intentions' (in praktischer
Absicht), as participant members of an intelligible order of things.
We then understand it to be our practical task to 'give to the world
of the senses the form of an intelligible world'.79
Despite the moral significance which Kant himself obviously
attaches to our practical comprehension of the theoretical incom-
prehensibility of our freedom as a postulate of pure practical
reason, recent interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy have
tended to treat this aspect of the Kantian idea of freedom as practic-
ally irrelevant. The emphasis has been on avoiding the noumenal
dimension of Kant's practical philosophy by interpreting the idea
of freedom, so far as possible, in strictly immanent, practical
terms.80 This now dominant interpretation of Kantian practical
freedom has been sharply criticized by Jean Grondin for ignoring
what he refers to as the 'contemplative character' of Kant's
practical philosophy.81 Grondin points to our experience of the
subliminal character of the moral law, which Kant refers to in
the famous Beschluss of the second Critique.82 Our very insight
into the incomprehensibility of the grounds of the possibility of the
moral law, invokes in us a feeling of Achtung for the law, and that
feeling, as one which follows upon the insight into the law's incom-
prehensible 'majesty', supplies the proper incentive to moral
action. Yet Achtung for the moral law as the proper incentive for
action in accordance with it would not be possible in the absence
of our insight into the law's noumenal dimension. Indeed, and
returning to the Rechtslehre, what is most striking about Guyer's
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reading of it is the impoverished account of the ends of Right he
offers.
Although what Guyer refers to as his 'teleological' account of
Kantian freedom differs from currently dominant, Rawlsian
constructivist interpretations, he shares with the latter a concern to
eclipse Kant's references to a noumenal dimension from it. Thus,
according to Guyer, freedom constitutes 'the supreme value of
morality' towards the empirical realization of which every rational
being necessarily strives.83 The 'intrinsic value of freedom' is said
to be closely connected with its 'instrumental value' as a means to
the attainment of human happiness. On the one hand, freedom is
instrumentally valuable in 'putting us in control over the source of
our happiness'. In enabling us to choose and to pursue our own
goals and projects, freedom provides a 'more secure and certain
foundation of our happiness than mere nature'.84 On the other
hand, there is also the 'special intrinsic happiness that we get from
the idea of freedom itself. This happiness is the 'pleasure we take
in the thought that we are the authors of our happiness'.85 Hence,
'the source of our special and deepest satisfaction in the exercise of
our freedom is not our escape from the sensible world but the very
fact of our unification of our desires and conduct in the sensible
world, or our transformation of the sensible world into a rational
world'.86
For Guyer, freedom is of supreme moral value in so far as it
is both the condition for the maximal realization of worldly
happiness and the source of the special contentment that comes
from viewing oneself as the author of one's own fate. This concep-
tion of Kantian freedom as the condition of the realization of
human happiness helps explain Guyer's reading of the juridical
postulate in the Rechtslehre. For Guyer, Kant's property argument
is an integral aspect of the practical realization of freedom under-
stood as the achievement of maximal possible happiness for
purposively rational beings. Since control over external objects of
one's choice is a condition of individuals' pursuing their freely
chosen and rationally purposive activities, it is 'rational for all
affected parties to adopt a system of property rights'.87 The attribu-
tion to individuals of a rationally necessary interest in establishing
a system of property rights resolves the ambiguity noted earlier in
relation to Guyer's treatment of the idea of the general united will.
The postulate's moral validity was there said to be a function of
28 KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 12, 2007
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 14 May 2012 IP address: 158.143.197.75
KANT'S INDEMONSTRABLE POSTULATE OF RIGHT
individuals' possible endorsement of it under the idea of a general
united will. While this move made the postulate's validity condi-
tional upon the possibility of the idea of a general united will, it left
the modality of that idea - its rational necessity - unexplained.
Guyer's account of freedom resolves that puzzle. It now turns out
that free and purposive beings have a necessary rational interest in
acting in accordance with the idea of a general united will because
they have a necessary rational interest in establishing a system of
property rights as a condition of realizing their freedom and the
happiness its realization affords them. For Guyer, therefore,
'[Kant's] analysis of property makes the preservation of the liberty
to acquire property the fundamental reason for the creation and
maintenance of government.'88 Yet, although it delivers a practical
proof of sorts of the ultimate grounds of our juridical duties
towards one another - these grounds lie in the quest for happiness
- Guyer's reading yields a curiously restricted conception of Kant's
philosophy of Right. This is so not just because in making the
protection of property rights the fundamental reason for entrance
into the civil condition Guyer ignores Kant's own claims regarding
the ends of civil society:
The concepts of the Right of a state and of a Right of nations lead
inevitably to the Idea of a Right for all nations (ius gentium) or cosmo-
politan Right (ius cosmopoliticus). So if the principle of outer freedom
limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of
rightful condition, the framework of all others is unavoidably under-
mined and must finally collapse.89
In the present context this quote is of interest primarily in so far
as it indicates the unconditional nature of Kant's conception of our
juridical duties towards one another: the end of Right is the
gradual establishment of thoroughgoing, that is global, relations of
Right among subjects. The establishment of such thoroughgoing
relations of Right is, in other words, an end in itself. The restrictive
character of Guyer's reading, by contrast, consists in its tendency
to instrumentalize the concept of Right. We are said to have an
interest in establishing relations of Right with one another because
of some other interest of ours (happiness through freedom) we
further in so doing. This reading precisely fails to capture the force
of Kant's claim that entrance into the civil condition is an a priori
obligation willed by reason and for the sake of reason. Admittedly,
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to say that entrance into the civil condition is willed by reason for
the sake of reason is to issue a claim that is deeply opaque: it is not
a claim which we can easily make sense of. But this does not
warrant the conclusion that the claim is valid only so long as we
can interpret it in a way that does make sense to us. We may not be
able to make sense of it precisely because this sort of claim eschews
instrumentalization: the claim may be constitutively opaque for
finite rational beings like us. In other words, it may be the case that
for a claim like this to be fully comprehensible to us, we are
constrained to give it an instrumental explication. If this is so - if
we are able to render the grounds of the concept of Right fully
comprehensible to ourselves only at the cost of instrumentalizing
it - any attempt to render it fully comprehensible will threaten
to deprive Kant's political philosophy of its most arresting prop-
osition: its view of the practical realization of relations of Right as
an end in itself. If, for finite rational beings like us, any fully
transparent proposition of practical reason unavoidably takes the
form of an instrumental explication, such beings can preserve the
unconditional character of morality only by acknowledging that
some propositions of practical reason are not fully transparent to
them - are constitutively opaque to them. At the same time it is
their comprehension of that opacity - their comprehension of its
incomprehensibility - which constitutes subjects' most powerful
incentive to action in accordance with the moral law.
It is the advantage of the alternative interpretation of the
juridical postulate here proposed that in preserving this insight into
the constitutive opacity, for us, of the ultimate grounds of morality,
it makes possible an appreciation of the unconditional character of
the universal principle of Right. Recall the reflective effect of the
postulate upon us: we raise a claim to external possession and find
ourselves obligated to join into civil society. We had not anticipated
this result. Yet in eliciting our recognition of the fact that we owe
one another obligations of Right merely in virtue of our standing as
free agents, the postulate deepens our juridical moral perspective.
As beings who cannot but think of themselves as free, at least from
a practical perspective, we must acknowledge our membership in
an intelligible order of things. The establishment of thoroughgoing
relations of Right as an end in itself then articulates, in practical
terms, our capacity, in virtue of our freedom, 'to give the world of
the senses, as sensuous nature (which concerns rational beings), the
form of an intelligible world'.90
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Nothing in my interpretation renders the instrumental concep-
tion of Right impermissible: it only puts it into its proper
perspective. In so far as finite rational beings' comprehension of
the grounds of the concept of Right is unavoidably limited to an
instrumental explication of these grounds, they may be able to
effect the practical realization of relations of Right only by means
of the instrumental conception: only by securing, through its actual
institutionalization, the right to external possession of each. It may
be that, for Kant, the gradual establishment of thoroughgoing rela-
tions of Right can only take the form, among finite rational beings,
of a globally instituted system of property rights. But the means to
the establishment of relations of Right must not be conflated with
the ends of Right. Instituting relations of Right is not a means to
securing property rights. Rather, establishing property rights
among finite rational subjects is a means to establishing thorough-
going relations of Right between them. Only an interpretation of
the postulate of Right which takes seriously Kant's reminders
regarding its theoretical indemonstrability, and our practical
comprehension of its indemonstrability can preserve this insight by
Kant of Right as an end in itself.91
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